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1 Introduction
Under the European Union's Energy Eﬃciency Directives, Ireland is obliged
to promote energy eﬃciency and achieve a targeted reduction in energy con-
sumption of 20% by 2020 (European Parliament and the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, 2012). Improving the energy eﬃciency of the nation's building
stock is one policy aim of the Irish government (DCENR, 2014). Nearly 40%
of ﬁnal energy consumption in the EU occurs in buildings, with two thirds
of residential consumption used for space heating (European Commission,
2011), providing a signiﬁcant opportunity for policy to improve residential
energy eﬃciency. Many European governments oﬀer ﬁnancial incentives for
residential retroﬁt measures. Examples include the UK's recently concluded
green deal, providing up-front ﬁnance for retroﬁt measures, to be paid back
through savings on energy bills, and France's crédit d'impôt développement
durable, a tax credit available for heating and energy conservation works
on the home. Grant aid is oﬀered by the Sustainable Energy Authority of
Ireland (SEAI) to homeowners who wish to undertake retroﬁt measures to
improve the energy eﬃciency of their home. This scheme has been successful
in aiding the completion of over 160,000 retroﬁt installations since the intro-
duction of the scheme in 2009, but achieving the national target of energy
savings equivalent to a 20% reduction on historic energy demand is ambi-
tious and ultimately will require either more homes to improve or for homes
to engage in more comprehensive retroﬁts. With a view to engaging more
homes in energy eﬃciency retroﬁts, of all households applying to the Better
Energy Homes (BEH) scheme to date, 15% abandon their application. To
help drive residential retroﬁtting activity, it is therefore important to gain
a greater understanding of why some homes are disengaging from the BEH
scheme subsequent to submitting their applications.
This research aims to gain an understanding of the characteristics of
households who make a decision to engage in an energy eﬃcient retroﬁt but,
after applying for grant aid, abandon their application. This abandonment
could be either through cancellation or by allowing an application to expire
and not making any subsequent applications. This research also explores the
role of obligated parties in engaging households through the BEH scheme.
Obligated parties are energy distributors and retailers who are obliged by
the Irish government to achieve energy savings of 1.5% each year through
energy eﬃcient measures, and contribute to Energy Eﬃciency Directive tar-
gets (DCENR, 2014). This process is described in more detail in section 2.
Given the heterogeneity in household characteristics and behaviours, it is un-
clear which households are less likely to follow through with the installation
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of energy eﬃcient measures (EEMs). By gaining such an insight, it may be
possible to identify households which may require greater support following
application to the scheme, thus helping to achieve more energy eﬃciency
savings.
There exist many beneﬁts to engaging in retroﬁt measures in the home,
most notably the reduction in energy costs, increased comfort, environmental
beneﬁts (Clinch and Healy, 2000; Gillingham et al., 2009), health beneﬁts
(Howden-Chapman et al., 2012) and in many cases, an increased sale value
of the property (Hyland et al., 2013). Previous literature has explored the
drivers of energy eﬃcient retroﬁt behaviour. These include socio-economic
conditions and speciﬁc household characteristics (Cameron, 1985), the cost
and proﬁtability of the home retroﬁt investment (Amstalden et al., 2007;
Sadler, 2003) and the availability of ﬁnancial subsidies (Neuhoﬀ et al., 2012).
Speciﬁcally in the Irish context, it has been found that the decision to invest
in Energy Eﬃciency Measures (EEMs) is determined mainly by the cost of
investment and gains in energy savings, followed by comfort gains. Moreover,
environmental beneﬁts were found to be of little concern (Aravena et al.,
2016).
While a wider range of literature exists on the decision by households to
engage in energy eﬃcient retroﬁts, little exists with regard to those who are
interested in retroﬁtting, but ultimately do not implement the desired mea-
sures. Many barriers to investing in energy eﬃcient technology exist, both for
households and organisations. Sorrell et al. (2000) discuss barriers to energy
eﬃciency in public and private organisations, the ﬁndings of which may also
be applied to households, dividing these barriers into three categories, being
economic, behavioural and organisational barriers. Economic barriers include
the neo-classical barriers to trade, such as imperfect information, access to
capital and hidden costs. Organisational barriers include power-related and
culture-related barriers. Power-related barriers, in the case of residential
retroﬁts may be that those who would like to engage in retroﬁtting may not
be the key household decision maker, or could be tenants in a rental property
where the landlord or owner prevents investment. Culture also has a large ef-
fect. For example, if energy eﬃciency or environmental concerns are not seen
as priorities, individuals will be less likely to invest. Behaviourally, bounded
rationality and cognitive limitations may prevent a thorough understanding
of the beneﬁts of retroﬁt investments, leading to excessive discounting of fu-
ture beneﬁts. Inertia, lack of environmental awareness and lack of trust for a
source of information may also inhibit energy eﬃcient investments. Of these
barriers, much research has underlined the importance of the lack of informa-
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tion and incentives as barriers to investment in residential energy eﬃciency
(Henryson et al., 2000; Clinch and Healy, 2000; Caird et al., 2008; Jaﬀe and
Stavins, 1994; Mills and Schleich, 2012). In the context of this research, these
barriers have been either fully or partially overcome as homeowners have be-
come engaged with the BEH scheme. Subsequent factors therefore lead to
abandonment.
A narrow range of abandonment literature exists, spanning various do-
mains, although common methods of analysis are used. Phillips and Zhao
(1993) examine the abandonment of assistive technology for people with dis-
abilities, using a logistic regression to investigate the determinants of aban-
donment. Volden (2007) also uses a logistic regression model to analyse the
likelihood that a state will abandon a policy action depending on inherent
state characteristics and the success or failure of similar policies in neigh-
bouring states. In terms of application abandonment, Lemley and Sampat
(2008) descriptively analyse the abandonment of patent applications, look-
ing at the proportion of applications which were abandoned in the US across
various applicant characteristics. Looking speciﬁcally at abandonment of
energy eﬃcient retroﬁt applications, Aravena et al. (2016) analysed survey
data collected from participants in the BEH scheme in 2009. This research
found that the main barriers to retroﬁt implementation were a lack of own
funds, other priorities and the perception that a retroﬁt investment would
not provide value for money. It was also shown, using a probit regression
model, that those who noted environmental beneﬁts as a reason for pursuing
a retroﬁt were slightly more likely to abandon. One key diﬀerence between
this work and Aravena et al. (2016) is that we examine the actual behaviour
of the population of BEH applications, as opposed to a stated preferences
approach which examined a subset of BEH applicant households.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2. provides a
description of the BEH data. Section 3. contains a discussion of modelling
and estimation issues. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of
the estimation results in Section 4., while Section 5. concludes.
2 Descriptive Analysis
The Better Energy Homes scheme, originally known as the Home Energy
Savings scheme, was developed by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ire-
land (SEAI) and, following a pilot in 2008, began in March 2009. It is a grant
aid scheme for households to engage in energy eﬃciency improvements, with
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grants available for various EEMs. Grants are available for roof/attic insu-
lation, one of three types of wall insulation (cavity insulation, external wall
insulation or internal dry-lining), three types of boiler upgrade (oil boiler or
gas boiler with heating controls upgrade or heating controls upgrade only)
and solar collector (panel or tube) installation. This means that a household
may adopt up to a maximum of four EEMs as only one type of wall insula-
tion or boiler upgrade may be awarded grant aid. Upgrades must meet SEAI
standards for grant applications to be successful. For the purposes of our
analysis, we view both types of solid wall insulation (external insulation and
internal dry-lining) and both types of boiler upgrade (oil or gas boiler) as one
measure, referred to in future as solid wall insulation and boiler upgrades.
The level of grant aid available has changed over time, with information on
the dates of these amendments and the changes made detailed in Table 1. As
part of the application process, certain information on the household is re-
quired, alongside estimation of the energy eﬃciency of the applicant property
and an assessment of the energy eﬃciency of the property following adoption
of the relevant EEMs. This provides a detailed dataset, including informa-
tion on the EEMs adopted, the household and the contracting arrangement
in place for EEM adoption.
Table 1: Grant Structure
Measure Category Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5
Mar-09 Jun-10 May-11 Dec-11 Mar-15
AC AC AC AC AC
Roof Attic Insulation 250 250 200 200 300
Wall Cavity Wall Insulation 400 400 320 250 300
Internal Dry-Lining 2500 2500 2000 . .
Apartment or Mid-terrace House . . . 900 1200
Semi-detached or End of Terrace . . . 1350 1800
Detached House . . . 1800 2400
External Wall Insulation 4000 4000 4000 . .
Apartment or Mid-terrace House . . . 1800 2250
Semi-detached or End of Terrace . . . 2700 3400
Detached House . . . 3600 4500
Heating Controls High eﬃciency boiler (oil or gas) upgrade with heating controls 700 700 560 560 700
Heating Controls upgrade only 500 500 400 400 600
Solar Heating . . 800 800 1200
BER
Before & After
Building Energy Rating 100 . . . .
After Works Building Energy Rating . 100 80 50 50
Bonus Bonus for 3rd measure . . . . 300
Bonus for 4th measure . . . . 100
Our dataset considers all ﬁrst-time applications from March 2009 to
March 2015, inclusive. Additional data available to October 2015 were ex-
cluded as abandonment of applications from April 2015 onward could not be
identiﬁed. The breakdown of ﬁrst-time applications in our data is presented
in Figure 1. As shown, 69% of applications were successful, with a further 2%
partially successful and 3% ongoing upon receipt of the data. While 1% of
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Observations Proportion Observations Proportion
First-Time Applications Period of Construction
Not Fully Abandoned 192,771 0.8409 pre - 1900 6,887 0.0300
Fully Abandoned 36,475 0.1591 1901 - 1920 4,998 0.0218
229,246 1921 - 1940 11,559 0.0504
Measures 1941 - 1960 22,638 0.0987
1 69,138 0.3016 1961 - 1980 66,873 0.2917
2 138,812 0.6055 1981 - 2000 83,675 0.3650
3 19,588 0.0854 2001 - 32,616 0.1423
4 1,708 0.0075 229,246
229,246 Location
Combination Greater Dublin Area 58,331 0.2544
Boiler 40,426 0.1763 Counties w/ City 73,491 0.3206
Solid Wall Insulation 13,694 0.0597 Border-Midlands-West (ex. G) 48,494 0.2115
Solar Collector 7,087 0.0309 South-East (ex. GDA,C,L,W) 48,930 0.2134
Attic + Cavity Insulation 115,010 0.5017 229,246
Attic + Solid Wall Insulation 11,921 0.0520
Attic + Cavity + Boiler 7,866 0.0343 Island Status
Attic + Solid Wall + Boiler 6,236 0.0272 Mainland 228,956 0.9987
Attic + Cavity + Boiler + Solar 580 0.0025 Island 290 0.0013
Attic + Solid Wall + Boiler + Solar 834 0.0036 229,246
Other (1 EEM) 7,931 0.0346 Obligated Party Status
Other (2 EEMs) 11,881 0.0518 Private 214,734 0.9367
Other (3 EEMs) 5,486 0.0239 OP 1 1,545 0.0067
Other (4 EEMs) 294 0.0013 OP 2 411 0.0018
229,246 OP 3 10,271 0.0448
Scheme OP 4 1,581 0.0069
1 73,299 0.3197 OP 5 356 0.0016
2 62,873 0.2743 OP 6 348 0.0015
3 34,582 0.1509 229,246
4 57,473 0.2507 Season
5 1,019 0.0044 Winter 64,351 0.2807
229,246 Spring 55,360 0.2415
Summer 48,899 0.2133
Dwelling Type Autumn 60,636 0.2645
House 223,970 0.9770 229,246
Apartment 5,276 0.0230
229,246
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP (000,000) 229,246 36,300 1,690 34,700 42,700
applications were declined, 10% were abandoned with the household subse-
quently re-applying and the remaining 15% were completely abandoned, i.e.
the household did not make any subsequent applications through the BEH
scheme. We thus analyse the likelihood of the complete abandonment of ﬁrst
time applications. Using unique household identiﬁers, these applications are
such that have been cancelled, or allowed to expire by the household, without
any further applications from that household occurring in the data.
Figure 1: Breakdown of ﬁrst-time applications
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Information is also provided on the location of the household, on a county
by county basis. In order to look at regional variations and variations be-
tween urban and rural areas, we have divided applications into four cate-
gories. The ﬁrst of these is the Greater Dublin Area (Dublin, Meath, Kildare
and Wicklow). Secondly, as a proxy for urban areas, we have identiﬁed the
four largest urban areas outside of the GDA and categorised applications
from the counties in which these cities are located (Cork, Limerick, Galway
and Waterford). The remaining applications were then divided by regional
assembly, being the South and East NUTS II region (excluding the GDA,
Cork, Limerick and Waterford) and the Border Midlands West NUTS II re-
gion (excluding Galway). Also provided are the type of dwelling, i.e. house
or apartment, and whether the dwelling is located on an island, in which case
households are entitled to 150% of the grant aid available. Information on
which EEMs a households intends to adopt and the date of application are
included.
As a proxy for income over time, we include data on GDP at the month
of application, measured in constant 2013 euro. It may be noted that for
model estimation, GDP has been standardised about zero. This allows the
estimated coeﬃcients of these variables to be interpreted relative to the stan-
dard case, where continuous variables are at their mean values. Descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 2.
With regard to the contracting relationship, the majority of applications
are made privately, with a household ﬁrst contacting a SEAI registered con-
tractor, before applying for the grant. The contractor then installs the rel-
evant EEMs, which is followed by a BER assessment and processing of the
grant application. Other applications are made via `obligated parties' and
`counterparties'.
Obligated parties are energy distributors and retail energy sales compa-
nies. The Energy Eﬃciency Obligation Scheme, pursuant to the EU En-
ergy Eﬃciency Directive, imposes a legal obligation on member States to
reduce annual energy sales to ﬁnal consumers by 1.5% by 31 December 2020
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2012). The
State requires obligated parties to reach certain energy targets, 20% of which
must be achieved by reducing residential energy consumption (SEAI, 2014).
The remaining 80% is divided into 5% energy poor residential and 75% non-
residential. The obligated parties are SSE Airtricity, Bord Gáis Energy, Bord
na Móna, Calor Gas, Electric Ireland, Energia, Flogas, Gazprom, Lissan Coal
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Figure 2: Obligated Parties and their Relationships
Company, Enprova/REIL and Vayu1. Of these 11 parties, six have engaged
customers via the BEH scheme. Within our dataset, obligated parties have
unique, anonymous identiﬁers.
Counterparties facilitate grant applications, interacting with the relevant
obligated party, home owner, contractor and SEAI. These counterparties are
related to obligated parties and are set up as a means of incorporating the
grant application process into their own service oﬀerings. In our dataset,
all applications made via an individual obligated party are also made via
the same counterparty. In our dataset, most obligated parties appear to
possess a relationship with an individual counterparty, which processes all
applications made via that obligated party. Obligated parties may use more
than one counterparty but in the period examined, only one obligated party
used more than one counterparty.
In the context of the BEH scheme, the relationship between these obli-
gated parties and others involved in the grant process is described in Figure
2. As shown on the right of the ﬁgure, obligated parties make initial contact
1Retroﬁt Energy Ireland Limited (REIL) is an obligated party, representing the Irish oil
industry, for which Enprova is a designated counterparty. All other obligated parties are
individual energy distributors and retail energy sales companies. For further information
see http://www.seai.ie/eeos/
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with households oﬀering EEMs in the home. If a household is interested in
EEM adoption, the obligated party will then engage a counterparty to con-
tact the household with regard to EEM installation. The counterparty will
then assign a contractor to complete the works and process the grant appli-
cation on behalf of the SEAI, who will then award the relevant grant aid,
provided the required standards are satisﬁed. Private applications, which
are more common, are illustrated on the left of Figure 2. Households engage
contractors to install EEMs and apply for a BEH grant, once the installation
is complete the grant application is processed.
Figure 3: First-time applications to the BEH scheme(by month)
Following implementation of the BEH scheme in March 2009, an average
of over 5,000 applications from unique households were received each month
to the end of 2011. As shown in Figure 3, this was followed by a signiﬁcant
reduction in applications, falling to an average of 1,294 ﬁrst-time applica-
tions each month, from January 2012 to September 2015. The ﬁrst set of
applications made via obligated parties and counterparties were received in
February 2011 and the number of applications received in this manner was
quite variable for the following eighteen months before rising to a steady
level of approximately 350-400 applications each month from mid-2012 on-
ward. As the total number of applications each month fell, and the number of
applications made through obligated parties/counterparties rose, these appli-
cations amounted to an average of 33% of ﬁrst-time applications each month
from July 2012 onward.
Figure 4. illustrates the rate at which ﬁrst-time applications were aban-
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Figure 4: Abandonment rates of ﬁrst-time applications (by month)
doned across the lifespan of the BEH scheme. As can be seen, abandon-
ment rates fell from an initial rate of around 30% to a reasonably steady
rate between 10% and 20% until mid-2012. From mid-2012 onward, over-
all abandonment rates have varied between 20% and 30%. Abandonment
of applications made via obligated parties were quite variable during 2011
and 2012 but from mid-2012 have fallen to steadier levels of between 7.5%
and 15%, remaining lower than private applications. A seasonal trend also
appears to be present for private applications, rising during winter months,
although this is not clear in obligated party applications.
3 Methodology
3.1 Modelling the Likelihood of Abandonment
Like Aravena et al. (2016) and Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007), we see EEM
investments as a multi-stage process. This investment process begins with
the decision to retroﬁt and the evaluation of the type of retroﬁt required,
i.e. which EEMs to adopt. In the Irish context, this may be followed by
the grant application stage whereby, prior to EEM installation, households
apply for grant aid through the BEH scheme. If approved, the next stage
is comprised of the decision to complete the retroﬁt. This is the stage at
which this paper is concerned. As discussed in section 1, various barriers
to completion exist and, with 15.8% of all ﬁrst-time applicants abandoning
their applications, we investigate abandonment behaviour as a function of
applicant characteristics.
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Once a grant application has received initial approval, we investigate the
probability that a household will choose to abandon their application. This
probability is expressed as follows:
Pr(abandonmentijm = 1) = f(Zi,Mi, Ri, Cj, Om) (1)
Where Zi is a vector of household characteristics. This includes technical
characteristics such as the age of a dwelling, and the preferences of the house-
hold, which vary by household depending on opportunity costs, behavioural
biases such as non-standard beliefs and preferences (DellaVigna, 2007) and
the disruptive impact of retroﬁt installation. Mi represents the characteris-
tics of the retroﬁt, including the types of EEM and retroﬁt intensity for which
grant aid was applied. Ri represents the regulatory conditions, such as the
amount and structure of grant aid available and minimum retroﬁt standards
required for grant application success. Cj is a vector of characteristics of the
contractor and Om a vector of characteristics of the obligated party involved,
where applicable. To specify our model we deﬁne a matrix Xijm, comprising
factors aﬀecting the application abandonment decision, such as Zi, Mi, Ri,
Cj and Om:
Pr(abandonmentijm = 1) = Yijm = f(Xijm) (2)
This paper aims to gain a greater understanding of the relationship be-
tween these characteristics and the decision to abandon an application for
energy eﬃcient retroﬁt funding. We do this by specifying a logistic regression
model, which is described next.
3.2 Logistic Regression
As the choice between whether to fully abandon an application or not is a
binary choice, a logistic regression model is used to model the probability
that a household will abandon.2 This probability is measured as follows:
Yijm =
e(ΣβijmXijm)
1 + e(ΣβijmXijm)
(3)
where Xijm, as discussed in section 3.1. For the purposes of interpretation,
odds ratios are estimated for the above equation. Odds ratios show the
2A probit regression was also considered but this did not cause any signiﬁcant changes
to the estimates of the model.
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odds of an abandoned application for a one unit increase in the associated
explanatory variable. 3
4 Results and Discussion
As we are using data on actual behaviour, we also avoid a common limita-
tion of energy eﬃciency research, which is the reliance on the use of stated
preference data about energy eﬃciency upgrades (Wilson et al., 2015). We
are able to use revealed preference data to identify variations in household
behaviour across the population of applicants to the BEH scheme, providing
new information on abandoned application within the scheme context. Table
3 presents the odds ratios of the estimated coeﬃcients of the model, control-
ling for retroﬁt intensity. Model 1 is the baseline speciﬁcation of the model,
looking at all obligated parties across the lifespan of the BEH scheme, while
model 2 controls for the ﬁrst six months of an obligated party's activity. This
allows us to examine whether obligated parties possess a learning phase with
regard to improving their application completion rates. The dummy variable
`New' controls separately for each party's ﬁrst six months of activity in the
BEH scheme. Model 3 looks at all obligated parties as one, using indica-
tor variables for applications made via an obligated party during its ﬁrst six
months of activity and thereafter.
Looking at the number of retroﬁt measures undertaken, relative to one-
measure retroﬁts, two-measure retroﬁts are less likely to be abandoned, while
3- and 4-measure retroﬁts are more likely to be abandoned. It may be rea-
sonable to assume that among the reasons why 3- and 4-measure retroﬁts
are more than 3 times more likely to be abandoned compared to 1 measure
retroﬁts is due to the greater levels of disruption and expense.
Looking at obligated parties, as shown in models 1 and 2, applications
made via obligated party 1 (OP1) are found to be between 28% and 40% more
likely to be abandoned, while OPs 3, 4, 5 and 6 possess lower probabilities
of abandonment, relative to private applications. Controlling for the ﬁrst six
months of an obligated party's activity, applications made via these newly
active obligated parties are much more likely to be abandoned. Considering
all obligated parties together, there is clear evidence that obligated parties
learn over time, as they improve their ability to complete works in the context
3See Hosmer Jr and Lemeshow (2004) for further discussion of odds ratios and their
calculation
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Table 3: Odds ratios of determinants of application abandonment
(1) (2) (3)
Measures (ref=1-EEM)
2 0.930*** (0.0135) 0.929*** (0.0135) 0.917*** (0.0133)
3 3.577*** (0.0676) 3.574*** (0.0676) 3.536*** (0.0667)
4 3.025*** (0.156) 3.021*** (0.156) 3.013*** (0.156)
Scheme
2 0.980 (0.0166) 0.977 (0.0165) 0.988 (0.0167)
3 1.048* (0.0212) 1.049* (0.0213) 1.076*** (0.0217)
4 1.348*** (0.0275) 1.344*** (0.0276) 1.337*** (0.0273)
5 1.433*** (0.127) 1.439*** (0.128) 1.426*** (0.125)
Year of Construction (ref=pre-1900)
1901 - 1920 0.874** (0.0388) 0.874** (0.0388) 0.875** (0.0388)
1921 - 1940 0.721*** (0.0267) 0.721*** (0.0267) 0.720*** (0.0267)
1941 - 1960 0.651*** (0.0218) 0.651*** (0.0218) 0.652*** (0.0219)
1961 - 1980 0.565*** (0.0173) 0.565*** (0.0173) 0.567*** (0.0173)
1981 - 2000 0.531*** (0.0161) 0.530*** (0.0161) 0.532*** (0.0162)
2001 - 0.647*** (0.0210) 0.646*** (0.0210) 0.647*** (0.0210)
Region (ref=GDA)
County with City 0.781*** (0.0128) 0.782*** (0.0128) 0.773*** (0.0127)
South East (ex. GDA,L,C,W) 0.834*** (0.0153) 0.836*** (0.0153) 0.827*** (0.0151)
Border Midlands West (ex. G) 1.161*** (0.0199) 1.164*** (0.0199) 1.150*** (0.0196)
Apartment 1.389*** (0.0491) 1.388*** (0.0491) 1.383*** (0.0488)
Island 1.149 (0.176) 1.148 (0.176) 1.149 (0.176)
GDP (z) 1.050*** (0.00918) 1.053*** (0.00932) 1.044*** (0.00909)
Obligated Party (ref=private application)
New Obligated Party 2.811* (1.142) 0.800*** (0.0462)
Exp. Obligated Party 0.529*** (0.0175)
OP1 1.413*** (0.0940) 1.287** (0.101)
OP2 1.122 (0.136) 1.242 (0.153)
OP3 0.509*** (0.0178) 0.478*** (0.0187)
OP4 0.180*** (0.0245) 0.177*** (0.0245)
OP5 0.615** (0.106) 0.527** (0.112)
OP6 0.635** (0.0969) 0.286*** (0.106)
New*OP1 0.504 (0.217)
New*OP2 . .
New*OP3 0.494 (0.205)
New*OP4 0.487 (0.410)
New*OP5 0.578 (0.313)
New*OP6 . .
Season (ref=Spring)
Summer 0.923*** (0.0171) 0.920*** (0.0171) 0.916*** (0.0170)
Autumn 0.958* (0.0175) 0.951** (0.0175) 0.949** (0.0174)
Winter 1.187*** (0.0197) 1.184*** (0.0197) 1.184*** (0.0197)
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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of the BEH scheme, with odds ratios falling from 0.8 to 0.529. Only OP1
appears to perform poorly relative to private applications.
Over the whole period of retroﬁt grant availability, the likelihood of aban-
donment did not vary signiﬁcantly when moving from scheme 1 to scheme
2, but rose slightly during scheme 3. Schemes 4 and 5 have seen a progres-
sive increase in the probability of abandonment. It may be possible that,
as scheme 4 possessed the lowest levels of grant aid, more households were
completing works outside of the BEH scheme. This would not explain, how-
ever, the further increase in the probability of abandonment during scheme 5,
which possesses the highest level of grant aid. It may be more likely that an
early adopter eﬀect exists, in that early adopters applied for a BEH grant and
subsequently completed works at a higher rate. With these early adopters
having already completed works, it is possible that the households making
subsequent applications do not consider an energy eﬃcient retroﬁt to be as
much of a priority and are thus less likely to complete their intended retroﬁt.
Looking at the year of construction of dwellings, relative to dwellings
built up to and including 1900, there is a downward trend in abandonment
probabilities across all twenty-year periods, except for dwellings built from
2001 onward. The downward trend may perhaps be due to the greater diﬃ-
culty and disruption required to retroﬁt older homes, which are likely to be
much less energy eﬃcient prior to retroﬁt works. It is possible that the older
cohorts of homes ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to meet the required energy eﬃciency
standards, and thus abandon works or possibly have works done outside of
the scheme to a lower standard and/or cost. With regard to 21st century
homes, it is perhaps likely that, as the gains from retroﬁtting can be ex-
pected to be lower, households are less likely to implement retroﬁt measures,
which is a presumption consistent with with the ﬁndings of Aravena et al.
(2016), who found that greater savings potential increases the probability of
completion. Inversely, lower savings potential should increase the likelihood
of abandonment, as the returns to investment, both in terms of comfort im-
provements and energy savings, are lower for homes that are more energy
eﬃcient prior to works. Apartments are also more likely to abandon, while
island dwellings were found to be no more or less likely to abandon than
mainland dwellings.
Regionally, relative to the Greater Dublin Area, counties with a major
city were less likely to abandon, with odds ratios of around 0.78. The South
and East region has a lower likelihood of abandonment, while the opposite is
true of the Border Midlands West region. This regional variation is perhaps
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due to lower incomes in the Border Midlands West region, as Aravena et al.
(2016) found income to be a strong determinant of retroﬁt completion.
A seasonal time trend also appears to exist. Relative to applications made
in spring, applications made during summer and autumn are less likely to be
abandoned, while applications made in winter are almost 20% more likely to
be abandoned. It may be possible that the disruption and discomfort caused
by retroﬁt works are more of an issue during colder weather, acting as a
deterrent to retroﬁt completion.
We also estimate our models controlling for speciﬁc combination of retroﬁt
measures instead of for the number of measures undertaken. Table 4 shows
the estimation results of these models, using the 9 most popular EEM combi-
nations. As shown in Table 2, we treat internal dry-lining and external wall
insulation as the same measure, named solid wall insulation, and we treat
both gas boiler and oil boiler upgrades as the same measure, named boiler.
We control for 1-EEM retroﬁts of boiler only, solid wall only and solar only,
with all other measures categorised as other 1-EEM retroﬁts. We control
for two 2-EEM combinations, attic and cavity insulation and attic and solid
wall insulation. All other 2-EEM combinations are included as one variable,
which we use as our reference category. The 3- and 4-EEM retroﬁts for which
we control are more comprehensive combinations following from our 2-EEM
retroﬁts, ﬁrst adding boiler upgrades, and then adding boiler upgrades and
solar installation. Again, other 3- and 4-EEM retroﬁts are categorised as
other.
Models 4, 5 and 6 treat obligated parties in the same manner as Mod-
els 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The ﬁndings of these models generally conﬁrm
the ﬁndings of models 1-3 with regard to changes in grant levels, dwelling
characteristics, obligated party behaviour and seasonal trends. A slight dif-
ference, however, exists when looking at regional variations and new insights
are added when looking at combinations of EEMs.
The reduced likelihood of abandonment when moving from 1- to 2-EEM
retroﬁts is likely due to the very low probability of abandonment of retroﬁts
comprised of attic and cavity wall insulation, which made up 50% of all
applications, as seen in Table 2. Only retroﬁts of attic insulation only, cavity
insulation only and heating controls only were found to be less likely to be
abandoned than attic and cavity insulation retroﬁts. Relative to attic and
cavity retroﬁts, solid wall only or boiler only retroﬁts were the next least
likely to abandon, respectively, followed by solar and then attic and solid
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Table 4: Odds ratios of determinants of application abandonment
(4) (5) (6)
Measures (ref=Attic + Cavity)
Boiler only 1.480*** (0.0270) 1.483*** (0.0271) 1.514*** (0.0276)
Solid Wall only 1.151*** (0.0331) 1.151*** (0.0331) 1.148*** (0.0329)
Solar only 1.658*** (0.0575) 1.680*** (0.0586) 1.680*** (0.0579)
Attic + Solid Wall 1.882*** (0.0495) 1.883*** (0.0496) 1.884*** (0.0496)
Attic + Cavity + Boiler 4.742*** (0.122) 4.744*** (0.122) 4.758*** (0.122)
Attic + Solid Wall + Boiler 4.198*** (0.126) 4.197*** (0.126) 4.216*** (0.126)
Attic + Cavity + Boiler+Solar 5.703*** (0.486) 5.706*** (0.486) 5.762*** (0.490)
Attic + Solid Wall +
Boiler+Solar 3.343*** (0.249) 3.347*** (0.250) 3.380*** (0.252)
Other (1 EEM) 0.870*** (0.0336) 0.873*** (0.0337) 0.875*** (0.0338)
Other (2 EEMs) 2.393*** (0.0584) 2.399*** (0.0586) 2.411*** (0.0588)
Other (3 EEMs) 5.232*** (0.154) 5.234*** (0.154) 5.253*** (0.155)
Other (4 EEMs) 3.668*** (0.450) 3.673*** (0.450) 3.710*** (0.455)
Scheme
2 1.010 (0.0172) 1.006 (0.0172) 1.017 (0.0173)
3 1.066** (0.0221) 1.066** (0.0221) 1.097*** (0.0225)
4 1.353*** (0.0280) 1.343*** (0.0280) 1.340*** (0.0278)
5 1.486*** (0.131) 1.485*** (0.132) 1.482*** (0.131)
Year of Construction (ref=pre-1900)
1901 - 1920 0.883** (0.0390) 0.883** (0.0390) 0.884** (0.0390)
1921 - 1940 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.746*** (0.0275)
1941 - 1960 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.710*** (0.0238)
1961 - 1980 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.638*** (0.0197)
1981 - 2000 0.610*** (0.0189) 0.609*** (0.0189) 0.611*** (0.0189)
2001 - 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250)
Region (ref=GDA)
County with City 0.854*** (0.0143) 0.855*** (0.0143) 0.848*** (0.0142)
South East (ex. GDA,L,C,W) 0.924*** (0.0174) 0.926*** (0.0174) 0.920*** (0.0172)
Border Midlands West (ex. G) 1.251*** (0.0218) 1.254*** (0.0219) 1.243*** (0.0216)
Apartment 1.319*** (0.0472) 1.318*** (0.0472) 1.318*** (0.0472)
Island 1.117 (0.171) 1.116 (0.171) 1.115 (0.171)
GDP (z) 1.027** (0.00904) 1.032*** (0.00919) 1.022* (0.00896)
Obligated Party (ref=private application)
New Obligated Party 2.783* (1.133) 0.868* (0.0502)
Exp. Obligated Party 0.532*** (0.0179)
OP1 1.426*** (0.0953) 1.350*** (0.107)
OP2 1.060 (0.129) 1.148 (0.142)
OP3 0.509*** (0.0182) 0.466*** (0.0186)
OP4 0.210*** (0.0287) 0.207*** (0.0288)
OP5 0.710* (0.122) 0.607* (0.130)
OP6 0.677* (0.103) 0.306** (0.113)
New*OP1 0.439 (0.190)
New*OP2 . .
New*OP3 0.575 (0.239)
New*OP4 0.461 (0.389)
New*OP5 0.588 (0.319)
New*OP6 . .
Season (ref=Spring)
Summer 0.906*** (0.0169) 0.902*** (0.0168) 0.898*** (0.0167)
Autumn 0.962* (0.0176) 0.951** (0.0176) 0.951** (0.0174)
Winter 1.217*** (0.0203) 1.211*** (0.0203) 1.212*** (0.0202)
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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wall retroﬁts. Attic, cavity, boiler and solar combined were found to be the
most likely to be abandoned, while attic, solid wall, boiler and solar combined
were found to be less likely to be abandoned than both attic, wall and boiler
combinations.
Obligated parties are again shown to possess a learning phase of six
months of activity. The extent to which applications made via obligated
parties during their ﬁrst six months are more likely to be abandoned than
private applications falls slightly. The odds ratio of abandonment of these
early obligated party applications falls from 2.811 to 2.783, a very slight
reduction. To test that six months is the most accurate estimation of the
learning phase, we estimate our model using learning phases of between 2
and 12 months. The results of these estimations are shown in table 5. The
increased likelihood of abandonment during the learning phase is statistically
signiﬁcant across phases of 2, 4 and 6 months, with the odds ratio varying
between 2.695 and 3.105. There is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of
variation in the likelihood of abandonment found for learning phases of 8
months or greater. We can therefore assume a learning phase of six months
is the correct speciﬁcation.
It is worth noting that, while variations exist in the probability of aban-
donment across obligated parties, the number of applications made made via
certain obligated parties are quite low. Figure 5. shows the proportion of
all ﬁrst-time applications made via each party. For example, while applica-
tions made via obligated party 1 are more likely to be abandoned, this party
contributes a very low number of applications and in some years has not
been active in engaging homes in energy eﬃcient retroﬁts. It may also be
noted that obligated parties have not been particularly active during their
ﬁrst calendar year and thus, while abandonment rates are higher during a
party's learning phase, this does not lead to a large number of abandoned
applications. As obligated parties have improved in their ability to process
applications through to completion over time, the proportion of applications
made via obligated parties has also risen.
In terms of regional variation, controlling for retroﬁt combinations, the
South and East region is again found to possess a statistically signiﬁcant lower
likelihood of abandonment, while the Border Midlands West region is found
to possess an even higher relative likelihood of abandonment, relative to the
GDA. Counties with a city are also conﬁrmed to possess lower likelihoods of
abandonment than the GDA, although this diﬀerence is reduced, with odds
ratios rising to slightly over 0.92. We believe this provides evidence of lower
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Table 5: Length of obligated party learning phase
Model 5
2 Months 4 Months 6 Months 8 Months 10 Months 12 Months
Measures (ref=Attic + Cavity)
Boiler only 1.479*** (0.0270) 1.483*** (0.0271) 1.483*** (0.0271) 1.481*** (0.0271) 1.486*** (0.0272) 1.483*** (0.0271)
Solid Wall only 1.150*** (0.0330) 1.151*** (0.0331) 1.151*** (0.0331) 1.151*** (0.0331) 1.153*** (0.0331) 1.152*** (0.0331)
Solar only 1.663*** (0.0577) 1.681*** (0.0586) 1.680*** (0.0586) 1.685*** (0.0589) 1.686*** (0.0589) 1.673*** (0.0584)
Attic + Solid Wall 1.880*** (0.0495) 1.883*** (0.0496) 1.883*** (0.0496) 1.882*** (0.0496) 1.885*** (0.0496) 1.884*** (0.0496)
Attic + Cavity + Boiler 4.743*** (0.122) 4.747*** (0.122) 4.744*** (0.122) 4.739*** (0.122) 4.740*** (0.122) 4.736*** (0.122)
Attic + Solid Wall + Boiler 4.198*** (0.126) 4.196*** (0.126) 4.197*** (0.126) 4.193*** (0.126) 4.200*** (0.126) 4.196*** (0.126)
Attic + Cavity + Boiler+Solar 5.697*** (0.485) 5.708*** (0.486) 5.706*** (0.486) 5.703*** (0.486) 5.710*** (0.486) 5.703*** (0.486)
Attic + Solid Wall + Boiler+Solar 3.340*** (0.249) 3.347*** (0.250) 3.347*** (0.250) 3.343*** (0.249) 3.349*** (0.250) 3.343*** (0.249)
Other (1 EEM) 0.870*** (0.0336) 0.872*** (0.0337) 0.873*** (0.0337) 0.872*** (0.0337) 0.874*** (0.0338) 0.873*** (0.0337)
Other (2 EEMs) 2.393*** (0.0584) 2.400*** (0.0586) 2.399*** (0.0586) 2.397*** (0.0586) 2.400*** (0.0586) 2.396*** (0.0585)
Other (3 EEMs) 5.232*** (0.154) 5.233*** (0.154) 5.234*** (0.154) 5.232*** (0.154) 5.236*** (0.155) 5.232*** (0.154)
Other (4 EEMs) 3.665*** (0.449) 3.672*** (0.450) 3.673*** (0.450) 3.670*** (0.450) 3.677*** (0.451) 3.671*** (0.450)
Scheme
2 1.007 (0.0172) 1.006 (0.0172) 1.006 (0.0172) 1.005 (0.0171) 1.004 (0.0171) 1.004 (0.0172)
3 1.067** (0.0221) 1.067** (0.0221) 1.066** (0.0221) 1.062** (0.0220) 1.059** (0.0220) 1.059** (0.0220)
4 1.351*** (0.0280) 1.344*** (0.0279) 1.343*** (0.0280) 1.341*** (0.0280) 1.336*** (0.0281) 1.340*** (0.0282)
5 1.486*** (0.132) 1.484*** (0.132) 1.485*** (0.132) 1.502*** (0.134) 1.456*** (0.129) 1.458*** (0.129)
Year of Construction (ref=pre-1900)
1901 - 1920 0.883** (0.0390) 0.883** (0.0390) 0.883** (0.0390) 0.883** (0.0390) 0.883** (0.0390) 0.883** (0.0390)
1921 - 1940 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.745*** (0.0275) 0.746*** (0.0276)
1941 - 1960 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.708*** (0.0237) 0.708*** (0.0237)
1961 - 1980 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.636*** (0.0196) 0.636*** (0.0196)
1981 - 2000 0.609*** (0.0189) 0.609*** (0.0189) 0.609*** (0.0189) 0.609*** (0.0189) 0.609*** (0.0189) 0.609*** (0.0189)
2001 - 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250) 0.753*** (0.0250)
Region (ref=GDA)
County with City 0.854*** (0.0143) 0.855*** (0.0143) 0.855*** (0.0143) 0.855*** (0.0143) 0.855*** (0.0143) 0.855*** (0.0143)
South East (ex. GDA,L,C,W) 0.925*** (0.0174) 0.926*** (0.0174) 0.926*** (0.0174) 0.927*** (0.0174) 0.928*** (0.0174) 0.927*** (0.0174)
Border Midlands West (ex. G) 1.252*** (0.0218) 1.253*** (0.0219) 1.254*** (0.0219) 1.255*** (0.0219) 1.255*** (0.0219) 1.255*** (0.0219)
Apartment 1.319*** (0.0472) 1.317*** (0.0472) 1.318*** (0.0472) 1.319*** (0.0472) 1.318*** (0.0472) 1.318*** (0.0472)
Island 1.117 (0.171) 1.116 (0.171) 1.116 (0.171) 1.117 (0.171) 1.116 (0.171) 1.116 (0.171)
GDP (z) 1.028** (0.00906) 1.031*** (0.00913) 1.032*** (0.00919) 1.034*** (0.00927) 1.037*** (0.00933) 1.035*** (0.00937)
Obligated Party (ref=private application)
New Obligated Party 3.105* (1.499) 2.695** (0.832) 2.783* (1.133) 0.937 (0.326) 0.798 (0.274) 1.090 (0.444)
OP1 1.362*** (0.0968) 1.359*** (0.102) 1.350*** (0.107) 1.118 (0.107) 1.227 (0.156) 0.927 (0.163)
OP2 1.062 (0.130) 1.089 (0.134) 1.148 (0.142) 1.198 (0.151) 1.253 (0.159) 1.316* (0.169)
OP3 0.501*** (0.0181) 0.477*** (0.0180) 0.466*** (0.0186) 0.445*** (0.0187) 0.426*** (0.0190) 0.430*** (0.0202)
OP4 0.211*** (0.0287) 0.210*** (0.0287) 0.207*** (0.0288) 0.197*** (0.0290) 0.206*** (0.0304) 0.223*** (0.0333)
OP5 0.700* (0.124) 0.599** (0.118) 0.607* (0.130) 0.725 (0.164) 0.793 (0.193) 0.660 (0.236)
OP6 0.612** (0.0996) 0.413*** (0.0968) 0.306** (0.113) 0.787 (0.299) 0.831 (0.312) 0.610 (0.266)
New*OP1 0.503 (0.264) 0.474* (0.165) 0.439 (0.190) 1.784 (0.663) 1.556 (0.582) 1.544 (0.694)
New*OP2 . . . . . . 0.0779* (0.0837) 0.0689* (0.0738) 0.0401** (0.0438)
New*OP3 0.749 (0.395) 0.723 (0.235) 0.575 (0.239) 1.757 (0.623) 2.098* (0.734) 1.378 (0.568)
New*OP4 . . . . 0.461 (0.389) 1.671 (0.875) 1.310 (0.680) 0.624 (0.343)
New*OP5 0.435 (0.402) 0.919 (0.468) 0.588 (0.319) . . . . . .
New*OP6 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Season (ref=Spring)
Summer 0.904*** (0.0169) 0.901*** (0.0168) 0.902*** (0.0168) 0.903*** (0.0168) 0.908*** (0.0169) 0.907*** (0.0169)
Autumn 0.962* (0.0176) 0.952** (0.0175) 0.951** (0.0176) 0.951** (0.0175) 0.955* (0.0175) 0.957* (0.0176)
Winter 1.219*** (0.0204) 1.217*** (0.0203) 1.211*** (0.0203) 1.208*** (0.0203) 1.211*** (0.0203) 1.212*** (0.0203)
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
probabilities of abandonment in urban areas, relative to rural areas.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
In order to help meet Ireland's obligated reduction in energy consumption,
residential energy eﬃciency retroﬁts are required across much of the housing
stock. To stimulate retroﬁtting activities, greater support could be provided
to applicant households during the application process as a means of prevent-
ing abandonment. We examine the likelihood of application abandonment in
an attempt to identify whether certain households are more likely to aban-
don an application than others or whether certain application types are more
likely to be abandoned than others. We use Irish data to model the likelihood
of abandonment of applications over the lifetime of the BEH scheme.
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Figure 5: Proportion of ﬁrst-time applications
Abandonment rates vary across obligated parties, with some showing
much lower likelihoods of abandonment than private applications. Obligated
parties possess a learning phase of six months, after which applications made
via obligated parties are less likely to be abandoned than private applications.
Attic and cavity insulation retroﬁts, which are the most popular combination,
are relatively unlikely to be abandoned, while more comprehensive retroﬁt
combinations are most likely to be abandoned. Rural households are more
likely to abandon an application than urban households, while apartments
are more likely to abandon than houses. Older dwellings are also more likely
to abandon an application than newer dwellings.
We compliment the literature on the abandonment of energy eﬃcient
retroﬁt grant applications by introducing a revealed preference approach to
measuring the likelihood of abandonment, based on characteristics of the ap-
plication and applicant property. Various policy implications may be taken
from the ﬁndings of this research. Reducing abandonment rates is an im-
portant policy aim given the need to increase the energy eﬃciency of the
housing stock. As such, it is useful to look at which applications are least
likely to be abandoned. As applications made via obligated parties are less
likely to be abandoned, lessons may be learned from this type of contracting
relationship. Perhaps an independent third party could be formed to facili-
tate applications made privately. This third party could act as a go-between
for home owners, contractors and SEAI. This may be particularly useful for
comprehensive retroﬁts, which are most likely to be abandoned. 3- and 4-
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EEM retroﬁts often require more than one contractor to install the diﬀerent
measures, which may be diﬃcult to manage for a home owner. The results
of this analysis may be used to identify applications with a high level of
abandonment risk. Administrators of the BEH scheme could therefore liaise
with the owners of these homes to reduce the likelihood that they will aban-
don. Alternatively, a designated third party to aid these applications may
improve completion rates for these more comprehensive retroﬁts. A party
such as this may also be able to develop a network of contractors to perform
works, which would lessen the likelihood of retroﬁts being completed outside
of the BEH scheme to standards lower than the required levels for grant aid.
A market solution could be found for these third parties to charge a commis-
sion to contractors, so as not to increase expenditures from SEAI, although
incentives would likely be required to prevent these works occurring outside
of the BEH scheme. Given the evidence of a learning phase for obligated
parties, policy-makers could organise workshops for new obligated parties to
advise on best practice or BEH administrators could liaise with new obli-
gated parties during these six months to reduce abandonment rates during
this period.
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